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Like the language of literature, critical language is composed of different 
voices, registers, points of view, figures of speech, forms of dramatization, 
rhythm, style and so on and is finally not to be distinguished from literary 
language as such.1 
 
Steven Connor wrote those words, but did not altogether mean them. He was 
outlining the rationale for ‘creative’ forms of criticism that had blossomed by the late 
1980s: a rationale he faithfully paraphrased, but from which he retained a cautious 
distance. Even as his own writing has unfolded new modes of daring and surprise in 
the quarter-century since, he has scarcely entertained the honorific title of ‘creative’ 
critic, or hinted that he would confuse his own prose with ‘literary language as 
such’. It is among Connor’s virtues that he remains so profoundly a scholar, too 
immersed in the archive to fancy himself a less transitive ‘writer’, too burdened with 
matter to traffic in empty form. Yet his writing has become distinctive, or indeed 
unique. Its traits and techniques are inseparable from the effect and worth of his 
work. 
This essay asks, therefore, what happens in Connor’s writing. The answer 
comes in two stages. First I will identify certain characteristic stylistic features across 
several texts that Connor has written. Second, I want to draw back slightly and 
propose four significant intellectual manoeuvres that his work displays. 
 
 
Tactics 
 
Steven Connor has written a great deal. Numerous major works will be left 
unquoted by this analysis; in fact the majority of my evidence will come from his 
many occasional essays. But where to start? Picked almost at random, the 2011 
lecture ‘Public Intellectuals and Public Intelligence’ presents one apt starting point: 
for it quotes no one, and thus presents us with undiluted Connor.2 I will begin here 
to spell out certain features of his writing, and in doing so I will start to move across 
other texts, seeking to show how these features are recurrent across his work. The 
recurrent is what is relevant here, by one of Connor’s own arguments: ‘Only that can 
happen that has happened twice: that has occurred, and then recurred, in the 
registering of what it can then be seen to have been.’3 
 Precision is a term so general that it might lack much precision. But some form 
of this quality is a major element of Connor’s writing. Consider these sentences: 
 
2 
 
We mean by an intellectual somebody who is believed, or believes 
themselves, to have a special vocation, warrant and responsibility for the 
forming of ideas and arguments. An intellectual is thought to be, or, by some, 
thought to be meant to be, somebody who has both more distance from 
contemporary affairs than others, and greater expansiveness of view. (‘Public’ 
2) 
 
Connor’s definitions aspire to the exactness of a work of reference. ‘Is believed’ will 
not do: he needs to add the additional possibility ‘or believes themselves’. This extra 
option might seem already contained in the more capacious ‘is believed’. Connor 
must, then, be intuiting some slight difference between the two: perhaps the 
difference is the hint of delusive grandeur in ‘or believes themselves’, in which case 
this neutral ground-clearing exercise is not quite so neutral. A sequence of options – 
‘a special vocation, warrant and responsibility’ – covers the ground and closes gaps, 
before the striking clarification ‘An intellectual is thought to be, or, by some, thought 
to be meant to be’. Would ‘thought to be’ not suffice? It appears to need another turn 
of the spanner. ‘Thought to be meant to be’ introduces another layer of distance: it 
places us at two removes from the ultimate object, which is subtly appropriate to an 
essay which tends to diminish and undercut that object. Meanwhile the addition has 
introduced four commas to the middle of a sentence which could otherwise have 
managed with none: ‘thought to be, or, by some, thought to be meant to be,’. This 
proliferation is a sign of the determined exactness in question here. The pauses the 
commas introduce after such brief sequences of words work as a display of finicky 
precision, as though this virtue is being openly prized over any other aim like sheer 
syntactic flow. 
 The single most defining characteristic of Connor’s writing may be, put in 
negative terms, an aversion to imprecision: a refusal to be caught making any 
utterance that could be dismissed for its slack inattentiveness. The impulse is 
manifest in the most inconspicuous marshallings of words. Thus in ‘Beckett’s Low 
Church’ (2007), ‘Beckett has become a centrepiece of attempts to recapture for 
religion or render as religious the experience of religious doubt, or doubts about 
religion’.4 Here both the action (‘recapture for religion’) and its object (‘religious 
doubt’) are doubled. In both cases, apparently, the first term proposed turns out not 
quite to be watertight as the best label for what is in question, and immediately takes 
the cover of a second. It feels as though two terms are better than one, for plugging 
any gaps in the sentence’s command of the situation. 
In ‘Collective Emotions: Reasons to Feel Doubtful’ (2013), another inflection of 
this will to precision is powerfully on show. A typical enough sentence is: ‘Collective 
subjects, by contrast, can never not feel the things they seem to feel, because they can 
never really feel them, and they can never really feel them because there is nothing 
left over from the feeling that is attributed to them’.5 Here the action does not 
involve equivocating over option and nuance, as in the Beckett sentence above, but 
rather a dramatic densification of thought. Collective subjects, we read, are unable 
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not to do something because they are also unable to do it – the sentence is already 
becoming crowded with echoes. And they are unable to do it (a repetition of the last 
point which makes for a chiasmus at the centre of the sentence) because – actually, 
Connor is arguing, because they do not exist, which means that the subject of the 
sentence is being erased even as it is being elaborated in its final stretch. In this 
essay, to a more heightened degree than usual, Connor’s polemic functions through 
abstract analytical reasoning. The repetition of phrases, within and across sentences, 
reflects this mode. But the style also becomes a display of the very ability to hold 
these complex terms in mind across syntactic distance. 
A term I have not yet dared use hovers around these examples. They hint at 
pedantry. The word seems relevant, if absolved of its usual pejorative connotations. 
When Connor produces a line like ‘The only kind of now there can be is one that 
depends on being able to be reported in a future (“tell him you saw me”) that 
thereby deports the now from itself into that future’ (‘Time’ 2), he is taking on or 
mimicking the pedantic mantle of the philosopher; but as a writer so attuned to 
words’ work, he is also attaching himself to a tradition of literary pedantry, in which 
(not at all coincidentally) Joyce and Beckett (who is quoted in the middle of the 
sentence) are foremost.6 We are still dealing with precision, but it is not the 
Hemingwayan sub-precision of the bare fact, but the elaborate semantic gambit that 
tries, as though for a wager, to hold its intellectual complexity together in a form that 
is lengthy enough to be hard to complete correctly, yet still in fact very compact (the 
sentence has no real superfluous word, save the parenthetical quotation). Exactness 
of thought and expression is an obligation, for Connor, but one that he comes to find 
himself able to sport with. 
 At the same time, his writing is distinguished by a penchant for colloquialism. 
Homely turns of phrase are legion across the later prose. In the short talk ‘A Time for 
Such a Word’, he ventures a brief barrage: ‘It’s double or quits with history; things 
must happen at least twice, or not at all. What goes around comes around, and it 
can’t get going until it has come back’ (‘Time’ 1). We might imagine the author 
settling into (and settling for) a phrase like ‘what goes around comes around’, 
finding the old saw falling to hand as he ponders the theme of return. In a sense the 
cliché is a placeholder, a readymade phrase to keep the writing going. At the same 
time it is enlivening: curiously, though clichés should be soporific, its arrival alters 
the texture and its briskness keeps the reader alert. And there is always, for a 
Beckettian, the prospect that the verbal readymade could hold an intellectual clue; 
reread or rewritten, a cliché might divulge a thought we did not quite know we had. 
 Even very small phrases count in this category. Consider Connor’s 
observation that ‘Public intellectualism is not something you could easily just go in 
for, even if you wanted to’ (‘Public’ 6). ‘Go in for’ is a wilfully rough-and-ready 
verbal phrase, which Connor has gone for instead of such alternatives as ‘choose to 
do’ or ‘elect to perform’. It makes a textural shift from the formal register that those 
terms would maintain. In a sense it simply lowers the tone. So, in fact, does the 
extrapolated noun phrase ‘public intellectualism’, which takes the desired dignity 
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and importance of the ‘public intellectual’ and pushes it two syllables too far. ‘Public 
intellectualism’ seems a term that only an autodidactically aspirational character in a 
situation comedy, a Hancock or Steptoe and Son, might use with an earnest face. This 
shading (or lightening) of the sentence thus has its rhetorical effect. This essay is 
largely an attack on the idea of the public intellectual; the overblown expansion of 
the term makes a mockery of it, while the loose colloquialism ‘go in for’ removes 
some of the dignity it might want to be afforded. 
 Consider likewise the end of this sentence: 
 
But we really must mean something more than this, for there are plenty of 
people who similarly devote themselves to such tasks and diversions – 
accountants, consultants, architects, engineers, teachers, proof-readers, 
computer programmers; indeed, viewed in this way, there seem, at least in 
our part of the world, to be a sizeable majority of people earning their livings 
in what have to be called intellectual occupations over butchers, bakers or 
candlestick-makers. (‘Public’ 1-2) 
 
A predictable end to the sentence might have been ‘those engaged in manual 
labour’. Connor has eschewed this in order to say something more colourful. The 
colour comes from a nursery rhyme, ‘Rub-a-dub-dub’, from the late eighteenth 
century, in whose lyrics the three artisans are found in a tub. This origin need not 
really be in the reader’s mind at all for the phrase to have its effect: it has become 
relatively detached from the rhyme to become a free-floating tag suggesting an 
assortment of trades. In the present context it brings a curious specificity that 
‘manual labourers’ would not; in fact to anyone who did not have the trace of the 
rhyme in their head, it might seem like a somewhat arbitrary, but helpfully 
indicative list of the sorts of professions Connor has in mind. The specificity may be 
deliberately intended to answer the specific contemporary professions listed earlier 
in the sentence: perhaps the labour of compiling that list put the author in mind of 
this older one that oddly foreshadows it. 
The fragment of rhyme feels very English: it localizes the text or its implied 
author. In fact Connor’s previous paragraph was precisely about Englishness, and 
affiliated its author with the declaration that ‘We live in a country’ which is 
suspicious of the intellect (‘Public’ 1, my emphasis). Connor’s invocation of the three 
trades does not align him with this native anti-intellectualism, but it does mark him 
as a native. The colour is local colour. More than this, the invocation of the rhyme 
introduces a note of child’s play into Connor’s text. Even as the theme is the solidity 
of a (now diminished) world of manual labour, this world is rendered to us via a 
rather fantastical image. The whimsy of the reference actually conveys the 
disappearance of Britain’s manufacturing base, more strongly than a more solemn 
phrase or list (‘bricklayers, steelworkers and workers on car assembly lines’) would 
do. That solid world, it is subtly implied, has melted into this ‘intellectualized’ era in 
which it has the reality of a nursery rhyme. 
5 
 
 Plainly, the idiom just considered borders closely on the comic. To talk of 
comedy in Connor’s work is to broach a topic that almost covers the entire field, so 
deeply imbued is his writing with a complex comic intelligence. There is something 
unmistakably light-hearted about the sentence quoted earlier: ‘What goes around 
comes around, and it can’t get going until it has come back’. Connor sometimes uses 
the term ‘jingle’ to suggest the ring of a recurrent phrase in critical theory (he can 
even hear a ‘Lacanian jingle’ [‘Collective’ 10]). His sentence here also jingles – with 
familiarity, with jaunty rhythm (‘jingle’ and ‘jaunty’ are connected, after all, by their 
repeated conjunction in the ‘Sirens’ episode of Ulysses, which Connor has declared 
his favourite novel). Distinctly from this whizzing lightness, though, we should also 
register in passing a more specific category, the deliberate throwaway line. Hence 
the parenthesis here: ‘Foucault and Lyotard assumed that intellectuals should 
eschew the role of universal intellectuals, intellectuals assumed to be and accredited 
as the embodiment of humanity, or at least the nation (in France it still seemed to 
come as news to some in the 1970s that sometimes this might not be the same thing)’ 
(‘Public’ 2). The clause echoes one of the earliest such moments in Connor’s writing, 
when in Postmodernist Culture he paraphrases Jean Baudrillard’s ecstatic vision of 
contemporary driving, then inserts the sentence: ‘(Baudrillard ought to try driving in 
my car through London traffic some time.)’ (PMC 169) This earlier jab is rather mild, 
though in context it secures its effect through contrast with the respectful and 
serious prose around it. The echo in late Connor is clear, as once again the English 
voice deflates a self-inflatingly rhapsodic Gallic vision. Both times this is performed 
within brackets: in effect their contents become a theatrical aside, a mocking mutter 
that we might imagine as inaudible to the solemn audience the other side of the 
parenthesis. The tactic is visible yet again in Connor’s guide to the Badiouian ‘event’: 
‘you need to think of something that you can’t possibly think of, an exercise that 
would tax the capacities even of the White Queen’ (‘Church’ 11). The remark is not 
tucked between parentheses, but Connor’s exasperation is given subtly comic voice 
through the sudden speeding-up of the prose (the mere shift to the abbreviation 
‘can’t’ is a telling tonal move, echoed again in the following sentence) and the 
allusion to a well-known figure from the whimsical branch of English literary 
history. (It is harder to imagine executing such a put-down via reference to Flaubert 
or Mallarmé.) 
 To our survey so far we must add certain varieties of heightened language. One 
variety is the relatively obscure word. Obscurity is relative, and one reader’s arcana 
is another’s everyday idiom. But some words are less widely used than others. 
Connor likes these. Afflatus (inspiration: ‘Public’ 3); diplopia (double vision: ‘Time’ 
2), apotropaic (a ‘deflecting’ brand of magic: ‘Time’ 3), anamorphically,7 
coenesthetically,8 rodenticidal9: these terms tend toward the technical. ‘Blent’ 
(’Collective’ 11, and used elsewhere in writing on air) is an archaism that has 
probably stayed with Connor from the ‘blent air’ in Philip Larkin’s ‘Church Going’. 
‘Ague-proof’ is more than once borrowed from King Lear. Cumulatively, this diction 
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suggests an intimacy with the OED, and makes the work’s intelligence seem 
enriched by disciplinary or historical reach. 
Such word-weaving suggests Connor’s penchant for etymology, as to employ 
a recondite word will tend to prompt reflection on its properties and history more 
often than will the recycling of a regular one. Thus Connor writes that ‘the present is 
always projective, time drawn like a bow by tendency or intention (tendere means 
just this, the bending of a bow)’ – a link that inspires him as far as an echo of Larkin’s 
‘Whitsun Weddings’ (‘Time’ 2).10 The word ‘world’, he informs us, has Germanic 
roots meaning ‘man’ and ‘age’, which offer to reorient the word as a temporal rather 
than spatial idea.11 Elsewhere the thought of belief prompts him to dissect the 
concept, at once intellectually and semantically. By the time Connor has spent two or 
three paragraphs on the word, with its history of ‘believing on’ and ‘believing in’ 
and its etymological kinship with ‘love’, it seems harder to be sure what it would 
involve to believe in anything. With enthusiastic nimiety he throws in an etymology 
of the ‘discourse’ – ‘in the literal sense of a running back and forth – dis-currere’ – 
which further troubles belief (‘Church’ 5-6). The effect of etymology is partly to 
historicize a word, to suggest depths within it or a past through which it has 
travelled. It also tends to open up English as we know it to other languages, 
primarily Latin, rendering something cosmopolitan and challengingly foreign in our 
words. Most significantly, it discloses shades of meaning, or emphasizes the 
meaning behind a meaning. What a word means to us is not reducible to its 
etymology, but might be increasable by it. 
 When etymological learning is tied to a creative spirit, neologism is their 
logical issue. Perhaps the first neologism committed to print by Steven Connor is 
perclusion, a ‘pervading inclusiveness’ identified in the opening chapter of 
Postmodernist Culture (PMC 19). He immediately adds a parenthesis to confess to 
‘surrendering to the urge to neologism’ as a characteristic postmodern rhetorical 
form. Connorian neologism is thus inaugurated alongside a perceptive analysis of 
the will to neologise. ‘Perclusion’ has a small-print endnote cameo at the very edge 
of Connor’s next book Theory and Cultural Value; but the apologetic tone will 
eventually be discarded.12 Early to mid-period Connor politely offers useful new 
terms, like ‘mimetic automatism’ in James Joyce.13 But the later Connor coins new 
words as though they were going out of fashion, as they quickly seem to do. 
Noticing a ‘contemporary oscillation between obese exorbitance and anorexic 
emaciation’, he reckons that we might call it ‘anorbesity’.14 Reflecting on Murray 
Schafer’s not widely familiar coinage for disembodied voices, ‘schizophonia’, he 
rapidly concludes that the word is already out of date, displaced by his own 
‘panophonia’ – though he modestly insists that the new word ‘must surely [...] have 
occurred to many others’.15 Thinking about the roots of the present, he throws out a 
new word for ‘nowness’ – nunciance – but barely bothers to justify it by using it again 
in this brief piece (‘Time’ 2). He seems more committed to a word for the merging of 
a sensation with a substance that we have come to associate with it, offering this 
time a glimpse inside the neologistic workshop: ‘I want to propose that we 
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encounter these qualities as hybrid “sensation-substances”. I’m not crazy on the toy-
train coupling of this phrase, but, alas, “substation” has been claimed for other work, 
so perhaps “senstance” can be made to earn its keep’.16 In a parody of his own lexical 
largesse, Connor glosses Gertrude Stein’s declaration of Oakland’s having ‘no there 
there’ with ‘anibidity, a word which I hope I have just made up, and for which I 
suspect I am unlikely after today ever to have any further use’.17 
 Neologism’s effect is clearly related to etymology’s: it bespeaks a saturation in 
words’ wellsprings. It adds an element of creation. The neologism is perhaps the 
closest that Connor can come to making something clearly new. The finest 
paragraph might be viewed as reshuffling existing ideas, but the insertion of a virgin 
word seems to guarantee a level of conceptual distinctness, for the word would 
surely not have been summoned into being were there not a hitherto unnamed idea 
or phenomenon in need of it. An analogy might be with the scientist’s identification 
of a new animal species: it was presumably there all along, but to pick it out and 
name it seems to add to the world’s stock of entities. Neologism is connected to the 
restless spirit of the later Connor who has chosen to abjure claims of political 
responsibility and instead to seek to optimize intellectual possibility. Accordingly, as 
the examples above show, it is profoundly playful. One does not sense that Connor 
would go to the last ditch for any of his coinages: he would sooner just mint another. 
Their newness grants them a relativity, a provisional quality: unused yet by others, 
they are untried as serious prospects in the marketplace of language. They might 
well not last beyond the occasional talk in which Connor introduces them, and its 
quiet archiving online. Yet each one seems in principle viable: a would-be word that 
could, in theory, belong to the dictionary. The later Connor has often insisted, in 
Beckettian vein, on limit; but neologism is one way that his writing keeps suggesting 
that our language is not, or need not be, as limited as we think. 
 Finally, a category likely to overlap with all we have observed so far, but that 
might gather what has not been collected: sheer verbal flourish. Consider even this 
mild case: ‘The phrase “public intellectual” is not a neutral descriptor – it is turgid 
with desire and frustrated longing’ (‘Public’ 2). This sentence commences with the 
definitional smartness reviewed earlier, but its second half lets in, or lets on, a lot 
more. It is not so much critique as contempt, introduced by the curiously subjective 
and emotional terms that Connor posits at the heart of what ought to be a more 
impersonally civic matter. A comparable effect is visible in a nearby 
acknowledgement of ‘the public intellectual as gadfly, sybil or jeremiah, offering 
dark warnings or thunderous denunciations’ (‘Public’ 2), with its multiplication of 
venerable roles and the melodrama of thunder. Here a touch of verbal excess is 
producing an atmosphere of irony, at the expense of the suspect concept in question. 
Connor’s flourishes can be freer and plainer than these. He likes to rhyme. 
Newspaper decays ‘from the flat into the fat’.18 (P 126). Identifying ‘dativity’ as 
entities’ ‘being-for each other’, Connor expands: ‘Subject and object have their rise in 
this dativity, finding in it their nativity’.19 This sentence has a slight air of superfluity, 
as though it has only been penned because the rhyme called for it. Sonorities 
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provoke Connor to linger over terms, producing echoes between them, seeing if this 
will flick on another bulb of meaning. 
But he can go higher than this. ‘Print is bleached, bony monochrome 
compared to these swirling, shifting, spectral, ancestral striations’: in such an 
assertion, what is primarily being asserted (the bareness of print, the rich ambiguity 
of voice) seems transcended, as well as thoroughly conveyed, by the line’s auditory 
extravagance.20 (We can bracket the paradox that this sentence about spoken accents 
only exists in writing – ‘Accidence’ was not written as a talk – and that this piece of 
writing seems to do more swirling and shifting than many people’s speech.) In a 
final example, Connor’s brief essay on twilight was perhaps not coincidentally a 
radio broadcast. Its regular touches of finesse – ‘a strange, faint flaring of the air, an 
oblique blaze in things’; light ‘aching evenly from every surface’ – rise, as in a 
firework display, to this punning and alliterative climax: ‘This refractory wryness, or 
angled Saxon attitude, prizes what pales yet persists, what lingers and lasts out, over 
the blaring conflagrations of noon’ (‘Slant’). Connor has here scaled momentarily to 
the rarified eyrie of the Nabokovian aesthete, selecting words for sound as well as 
sense, making phrases to relish their resonance. It feels momentary because, despite 
its ceaseless intensity and exactitude, his writing rarely climbs quite this path: it is as 
though he is doing this, for a sentence, just to show us that he can. 
 
 
Strategies 
 
The features catalogued above are primarily local textual effects: a matter of word 
choices and sentences’ shapes. I want now to stand a little further back and name 
four characteristic movements in Connor’s work that exist as much at the level of 
idea as of diction or style. 
We can head quickly, as though hurrying through a department store to what 
lies at its rear, through one very prevalent move, complication, simply because it is 
all-pervasive in any worthwhile modern criticism. Connor does inveterately say 
‘And yet’, setting up as straightforward an exposition as possible and then trying to 
undo its self-evidence. From the relentless deconstructions of Theory and Cultural 
Value to the swiftly swerving observations of Paraphernalia, the mode is characteristic 
– but the impulse to refuse the obvious is likewise characteristic of almost any writer 
of intellectual vim. More proper to Connor, a special display at the far end of 
complication, is the more wholesale inversion. This involves, explicitly or otherwise, 
confronting an accepted dictum and stating that the opposite is the case. ‘It is 
sometimes said’, Connor notes, ‘that animals have no past or future, but only an 
ongoing, unconscious now’. He thus naturally says otherwise: ‘But the truth seems 
to be in fact that animals can be nothing but their past and their future, since what is 
missing from their experience is precisely the experience of a now’ (‘Time’ 1-2). 
Against the idea that we should concentrate to think better about something, he 
asserts that we should drift off.21 In fifty years of Beckett criticism, he must be one of 
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the few to read Beckett in terms of athleticism (‘Javelin’). Declaring that the 
humanities are horrified by number and calculation, Connor cheerfully avows 
himself a Benthamite who supports the mathematical weighing of goods and 
pleasures (‘Blissed’ 6). Citing, in an interview, Wordsworth’s lament that ‘the world 
is too much with us’, Connor immediately adds ‘He’s completely wrong. We’re too 
much with ourselves’.22 
Here is one of Connor’s resemblances to Roland Barthes, who also thrived on 
the refusal of assumptions that he found too commonplace to be interesting.23 
Barthes had been a controversialist, but late in life he could modestly say that his 
aim was ‘To come up underneath conformity, underneath an existing way of 
thinking, in order to shift it a little’.24 Connor has enough self-irony to share this 
modesty, but the explicit form of his challenges to what Barthes dubbed doxa is 
uncompromising. Displaying a contrarian streak, he does not simply invert beliefs: 
he also makes a point of dismantling the very concepts he has been asked to address. 
At the seminar on public intellectuals, he opens by saying that ‘the idea of the public 
intellectual is sad, bad and silly’ (‘Public’ 1). His contribution to a series on aesthetics 
was ‘What If There Were No Such Thing as The Aesthetic?’: a topic reprised a 
decade later after causing too little controversy on its first outing.25 Addressing the 
history of emotions, which ‘seems scarcely operable without the idea of collective 
emotions’, he spends many pages demolishing the possibility of a collective emotion. 
More than Barthesian playfulness, a certain eloquent aggression is visible here: a 
tendency to make guerrilla raids into territory and knock out their key installations, 
or to accept invitations then bite the hand that feeds him. 
Reframing is a subtler manoeuvre, if anything more typical of earlier Connor. 
Postmodernist Culture was an outstanding work of its kind for its breadth and 
synthetic power, but in retrospect, at least, what distinguishes it still more is its 
insistence on reframing its subject. ‘[In] trying to understand postmodernism and the 
postmodernism debate’, Connor ventures, ‘we must look at the form as well as the 
content of that debate, must try to understand the priorities and questions which it 
produces as its own mode of self-understanding alongside the questions with which 
it seems to be dealing’ (PMC 5). Postmodernism, then, should not be taken at its own 
word. Connor bids us attend to how the debate actually functions rather than only to 
what it appears to be about. (The value of this approach accords well with a 
suspicion that, as often in academic discourse, what is called a ‘debate’ is barely 
worthy of the name, but is more a self-perpetuating set of repeated stances and 
statements.) Ultimately Connor proposes a new battery of more sceptical questions, 
which ‘shifts attention from the meaning or content of the debate to its form and 
function, so that, to borrow Stanley Fish’s formula, we ask, not what does 
postmodernism mean?, but, what does it do?’ (PMC 10). 
A very like strategy is on show at the start of The English Novel in History 1950 
to 1995 (1996), where Connor urges that the question of ‘what narrative is’ should be 
joined by the question of ‘what narrative [...] does’.26 Given the invocation of Stanley 
Fish in the previous case, we can assume that one source for this manoeuvre is 
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philosophical pragmatism, which became increasingly prominent in Connor’s 
writing through the 1990s, but was evidently seeded there earlier.27 Connor’s 
pragmatism allies with his utilitarianism. Both allow him to perform a certain 
obstinate debunking, in the ornery manner of Ezra Pound amid the Georgians. But 
in the instances cited, the pragmatic move is not so much a bringing down to earth 
as a clambering to new analytical height. What seems the relevant set of questions is 
noted, yet also parenthesized as Connor’s thought moves up a gear. The 
pragmatist’s reframing of an issue allows Connor to turn his dissatisfaction with an 
intellectual scenario into a new meta-scenario in which he can disclose the scene’s 
functioning in a new way.   
 A certain involution is among the most profound figures in the fabric of 
Connor’s work, yet is among the hardest to define. It involves his abiding tendency 
to find things connected to themselves. So Connor paraphrases Durkheim’s notion of 
‘effervescence’ as ‘the feeling of an excess of feeling, the feeling of feeling pushing 
beyond its normal limits, the feeling, felt by an excited crowd, precisely of an 
excitable crowding’ (‘Collective’ 1). In part, what happens here is a textual effect: a 
poetic gambit which tries to see how far a word can redouble itself. But writing here 
necessarily also means thinking. Connor seeks a thought composed of mirroring and 
multiplication, in which the exegesis of a term is achieved not by paraphrase into 
other words but by recycling the terms of the term itself. This mode can produce a 
sense of circularity. What might be held in the runaway’s handkerchief? It is very 
characteristic that Connor concludes his list of possibilities with the thought: 
‘Perhaps a spare handkerchief?’ (P 90). If the objects in Paraphernalia seem to have a 
life of their own, he avers, ‘it is a life that we give them, and give back to ourselves 
through them’ (P 4). Explicating the operation of prophecy, Connor describes ‘a 
speech act that saith “Lo, I hereby predict that something in what I here say, or will 
later be taken to have said, will come to seem like a prediction”. Or, in short, “I 
predict that this will one day count as a prediction”’ (‘Time’ 4). This side of Connor’s 
thought is kin to the Escher staircase or Moebius strip: a path that seems to lead 
purposefully outward brings the traveller back to itself.28 
Once one has sensed this motif’s presence, it seems present everywhere. James 
Joyce, because commissioned in a series called Writers and their Works, commences 
with a meditation on ‘the workings of work’. (Noticeable here, and also 
characteristic, is Connor’s fastening on to the easily overlooked words of the 
commission: an enlarged version of interrogating the terms of an exam question.) A 
Connorian word is apt thus to turn in on itself, splitting into gerundive forms and 
like derivations. It is not enough to analyze work: it must be worked through as 
work’s workings. There seems an intuition or superstition here that a word can be 
most exhaustively, reliably investigated by itself: a semantic homeopathy. It should 
not surprise us that in an essay on etymology, Connor explores the doubtful 
etymology of the word ‘etymology’.29 We can compare the circular motion of 
sentences like ‘Postmodernism became the name for the activity of writing about 
postmodernism’, or, more frenetically and somewhat obscurely: ‘Sex has come into 
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its own, because sex wants to be more than sex’.30 Comparable again, in its way, is 
Connor’s account of the self-replication with which an animal forms its home via its 
own form: ‘The burrow is the dwelling-place that is formed as a container by its 
content. Many creatures form habitations that are casts of their own bodies. [...] 
Worms riddle and aerate the ground and the sand of the beach through movements 
which continuously recreate their own form, which is the form of an elementary 
passage. A worm churns the earth both by passing through it, and by passing it 
through itself.’31 In this last sentence we can observe an inversion, but of a very 
different kind from the polemical mode surveyed a moment ago. Here the procedure 
is to find in or beside a phenomenon the inverse of itself. 
Perhaps what drives Connor’s reflexive instinct is a will to plenitude. Mirrors 
and echoes are good because two instances are better than one, or, in belt-and-braces 
fashion, safer than one. His involutions might thus be figured as a bid for harmony, 
the snug assembly of voices in parallel lending each other support that by contrast 
leaves a single vocal channel sounding exposed. As we observed in a different 
context earlier, the prose alertly patrols to close loopholes; at each moment, it wants 
to leave nothing unsaid or (notwithstanding Connor’s Beckettian pedigree) 
undersaid or missaid. The impulse to replicate, to fold a word into itself and out 
again, scouring its own corners for meaning; the impulse to echo a thought with its 
symmetrical reflection: these perhaps bespeak a desire to complete, to make every 
part of the object of thought communicate with every other part. Connor repeatedly 
refers to the game of tag in which touching another is a transformative act. His 
words’ desire to touch base with themselves is still more reminiscent of the Tourettic 
protagonist of Jonathan Lethem’s novel Motherless Brooklyn (1999), who is compelled 
to touch others or objects in mathematically symmetrical patterns. Connor’s own 
fascination with fidgeting is a less extreme version of this, instanced in his 
compulsion to check the location of his wallet and comb (P 63-4, 106-7). Half the 
objects in Paraphernalia come briefly to seem like the one meta-object that would 
carry the code for all others (as with the pin that is a ‘“stem-thing”, that is capable of 
being turned into almost any other thing’: P 147), but in the present context the 
presiding image is probably the knot, which holds things together by making 
different parts of one object touch and fold into each other. It is emblematic of his 
inveterate impulse to involution that Connor’s first announcement about this most 
inherently involuted object is that its two aspects are themselves ‘knottily 
intertwined’ (P 110). 
Against this intuitive ambition, one last motif: the abnegation that Connor’s 
work comes to perform. Even Postmodernist Culture was sceptically interested in 
‘critical modesty’ and the renunciation of authority (PMC 201-23), but it is the later 
essays that repeatedly insist on limit. Among Connor’s intellectual mentors was 
Terry Eagleton, whose many books for years would close with calls to arms. With 
Shakespeare or Richardson reread, the reader was primed for the coming 
revolutionary conjuncture: this caricature scantly exaggerates.32 To a striking though 
likely unwitting degree, Connor’s abnegation neglects to follow his former 
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supervisor’s lead. Cultural phenomenology itself, probably Connor’s best-known 
single theoretical intervention, was introduced with a disavowal of its wider 
potential.33 Ever since, he has scrupulously shunned most dreams that his work 
might change anything, save at the most personal, local, unpredictable level. 
This theme derives in part from pragmatism, as in the assertion that we can 
only foster ‘public intelligence’ by ‘dribs and drabs, ruses, resourceful opportunism, 
by trying to make intelligence more interesting and seductive than dumbness and 
good luck. Not, I think, by any kind of theoretical programme’ (‘Public’ 6-7). He 
commenced his career in an age of ‘theory’, which he learned to deploy as elegantly 
as anyone; but for the later Connor, theory holds no special power over the world, 
and the practice that replaces it is haphazard and imperfect. It is partly in reaction to 
the sleek, unassailable edifices of theory that once dominated the academic 
landscape that Connor now insists so repeatedly on theory’s relative inability to 
make things happen. The mood is also Beckettian. Specifically, Connor insists that 
the knowledge of limit is Beckettian, against a too intoxicated theory or theology that 
would pretend otherwise. Beckett instances a resolve ‘to decline any grandiose 
worlding of the world’ (‘World’ 13), and his ‘fundamental worldliness [...] entails a 
sad, glad giving over of the omnipotence of thought practised by all forms of 
theology’ (‘Church’ 18). Connor has performed an analogous relinquishment. In a 
last asymmetry, this astonishingly learned and intricately crafted body of writing, 
while giving so much away, has learned not to hope for too much in return. 
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